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In this paper, I introduce the concept of narrow content (Section 2.1) 
to discuss an account of narrow content by analyzing Fodor's 
methodological solipsism (2.2). I point out that Fodor's formalism, that 
is, the position according to which the content is reduced to formal 
properties of mental representation, eliminates (at least - as I show in 
Section 2.2.4 - in Stich's interpretation) semantic properties in favor of 
the syntactic ones. In addition, it leads to the conceptual problems 
indicated by J. Searle, S. Harnad (Section 2.3), and T. Burge (Section 2.4). 
In a nutshell, semantic internalism, as reviewed in this paper, does not 
offer an account of content that would be properly contentful, because 
it provides no grounds to ascribe truth or other semantic properties to 
representations. In particular, it is either unsatisfactory, because it 
reduces content to formal properties or inconsistent, because it appeals 
to innate contents that itself has not been properly explicated; 
moreover, innate factors, as I argue, are not merely individual. 
Consequently, I reject semantic internalism in favor of externalism.  
The purpose of this paper is to argue against the usefulness of 
narrow content in the account of mental representation. By reviewing 
the classical arguments in favor of the narrow content, I show that the 
notion is inevitably wrong-headed. This is probably the reason why 
even one of the most radical proponents of narrow content, J. Fodor, 
changed his mind and rejected the narrow content in favor of wide 
content (Fodor 2008). Any future effort of defending the notion of 
narrow content will have to face the challenge of demonstrating that 
the narrow content has semantic properties. 
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2.1. The philosophical notion of intension and extension 
It is generally assumed that there is an analogy between linguistic 
meaning and content of mental representation (Pitt 2013). 
Traditionally, intension or connotation (meaning for linguistic 
expressions, content for mental representation) and extension (mental 
representation can be about something, true or false about an object, or 
true or false simpliciter) are attributed to mental representations and 
linguistic expressions.1 The correspondence between language and 
thought with reality can justify this analogy; both linguistic expressions 
and mental representations refer to reality and describe it. 
A complex expression is extensional if its denotation is a 
function of denotations of its constituent expressions (Jadacki 2001). In 
extensional contexts, substituting one of the constituents of an 
extensional expression with a constituent with the same denotation 
does not change the logical (or semantical) value of the whole 
expression. Knowing the denotation of constituents of an extensional 
expression is sufficient to determine the logical (or semantical) value of 
the whole expression. I'll illustrate this by two sentences:  
 
a) George W. Bush voted for Barack Obama in 2012. 
b) The last but one ex-president of the US voted for Barack 
Obama in 2012. 
Sentence b) was formed as a result of substituting one of the 
constituents of an extensional expression, “George W. Bush”, with a 
constituent with the same denotation, “the last but one ex-president of 
                                                 
1 Connotation is the minimal set of properties related to a language expression X that 
anyone speaking the language to which X belongs can use to recognize the referent of 
X. The notion of connotation is traditionally used interchangeably with a concept of 
intension (Copi and Cohen 2002). However, these concepts are sometimes 
differentiated. This happens when one assumes a slightly different sense of intension. 
In the Carnapian tradition, intension is the function of language expressions onto 
noncontradictory sets of propositions (Carnap 1947), and in tradition of two-
dimensional semantics it is a function onto possible worlds (Chalmers 2004). This 
function assigns the extension to a term (in a given possible world). For example, in 
our possible world, the terms "Evening Star" and "Morning Star" have the same 
intension across contexts, but different connotations.  
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the US”, but the logical value of the sentence did not change. Both 
expressions refer to a specific person, that is the former US president, 
George W. Bush. 
An expression is intensional (referentially opaque) if and only if 
it is not extensional. In expressions occurring in intensional contexts, 
substitution of a selected constituent of a sentence with another 
constituent of the same logical (or semantical) value may change the 
logical value of the whole sentence. Intensional expressions include 
such sentences as "x thinks that p", "x knows that p", "x wants p", "x 
believes that p". Suppose that George W. Bush voted for Barack Obama, 
but Johnny does not know that George W. Bush is the last but one ex-
president of the US. I'll illustrate this by the following example:  
a) George W. Bush voted for Barack Obama in 2012. 
b) The last but one ex-president of the US voted for Barack 
Obama in 2012.  
Both constituent parts, namely "George W. Bush voted for Barack 
Obama in 2012" (in the sentence a*) and "The last US expedition voted 
for Barack Obama in 2012" (in the sentence b*), have the same logical 
value, but sentence a* may have a different logical value than b* if 
Johnny thinks that the last but one ex-president of the US and George W. 
Bush are two different people. 
2.2. Naturalized conceptual role semantics 
A naturalistic account of content of mental representation that 
explicates the content in terms of their functional roles in a cognitive 
system is a promising attempt to provide semantics for psychology. By 
a functional role, it is generally meant: 
the role of that representation in the cognitive life of the agent, e.g. in 
perception, thought and decision-making (Block, 1998).  
This definition of a conceptual role is, however, very general. It can be 
accepted both by internalists, who adopt the notion of narrow content, 
as well as externalists, who embrace wide content. Narrow content is 
limited to the functional role within the cognitive system, while wide 
content also includes the context and environmental circumstances in 
which the cognitive system is situated. 
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2.2.1. In search of narrow content. Cognitive nature of content 
According to internalists, the concept of narrow content suffices to 
describe, explain, and predict the intentional states of all cognitive 
systems. They consider the concept of wide content to be defective and 
useless in psychology, as the concept seems to be too dependent on the 
circumstances of its occurrence and insufficiently dependent on the 
structure of the cognitive system itself. In order to evaluate these theses, 
I will closely examine the concept of narrow content, the arguments 
evoked for its defense, and intuitions underlying internalist views. 
Internalists point out to the mind's ability to think about things 
that are not the case. I will illustrate such intuitions by an example of 
Johnny standing at the bus stop waiting for the bus. If he has an 
incorrect timetable, he may still think of the bus, even though a vehicle 
is not arriving and will not arrive. Moreover, the same thought about 
the bus can reappear in the boy's head at various times and at different 
places: both at the bus stop and at home. So, it would seem that 
thoughts preserve their content regardless of their context (place or 
time). Johnny can also think at any time of a mountain of gold, even 
though he knows perfectly well that it does not exist. Thoughts also 
retain their content when they do not refer to anything real. 
The concept of narrow content preserves the independence of 
content of thought with regard to such factors as reference and 
satisfaction conditions. Thus, an internalist G. Segal describes it as 
cognitive content in contrast to referential/truth-conditional content 
(Segal 2000). 
Internalism opposed externalism, including Wisconsin style 
informational-causal theory of reference, which rejects the autonomy of 
content from reference. The idea of extreme externalism was spelled 
out by H. Putnam in his Twin-Earth thought experiment (Putnam 1975). 
Putnam shows that intension does not determine extension. Imagine 
that on a distant Twin Earth, a liquid called "water" does not refer to a 
chemical substance H2O, but to XYZ. Water from Earth is 
indistinguishable from water on Twin Earth: it looks the same and 
tastes the same. Imagine that before the discovery of the chemical 
structure of water, before 1750, on Earth, there was Oscar1, who had a 
twin brother on the Twin Earth, Oscar2. Oscars did not distinguish XYZ 
from H2O and for both the intension of the expression "water" was the 
same: a colorless, potable liquid. Putnam claims that the meaning of the 
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word "water" as used by Oscar1 was not the same as the meaning of a 
word "water" uttered on the Twin Earth, because these expressions 
differed in their denotation. It is not the case that intension fully 
determines extension, because the environment is also critical for 
meaning. 
Internalists claim that there was a common meaning of the word 
"water" on both planets, which is not reflected in claims of externalists, 
according to which the content of the same term was different on both 
planets. Their claim overlooks, according to internalists, an essential 
aspect of mental content thanks to which one can predicate the same 
attributes about the same object independently of external factors. 
2.2.2. Determination of narrow content in terms of supervenience 
According to Block’s definition, internalists propose to characterize 
content only in terms of its causal-inferential roles within an individual 
cognitive system. Narrow content is therefore a part of the internal 
structure of an individual cognitive system; it participates in its 
cognitive life – in its inferences, decision-making, and so on (Block 
1987). The fact that it is all about the internal structure of an individual 
cognitive system is emphasized by Segal (who defines narrow content 
in terms of local supervenience), according to which narrow content is 
a property of mental representation completely independent of any 
external factors. Internalism assumes that narrow content can only be 
determined by the internal structure of an individual cognitive system. 
The content of mental representation is entirely determined by 
intrinsic properties of an agent or a cognitive system. An intrinsic 
property is a property that the object has (or not) regardless of what is 
the case beyond that object (Yablo 1999). An example of an intrinsic 
property is a square’s property of having-four-equal-sides: a square 
always has four equal sides, regardless of how things are outside it. On 
the other hand, being a living organism is not an intrinsic property of an 
organism, because the organism would not have this property if it 
didn't, for example, breathe oxygen. And so, intrinsic properties of a 
cognitive system are those properties of the internal structure of the 
cognitive system that remain independent of any external factors of the 
system. To talk of such properties, I will use a term microstructural 
properties. Microstructural properties are properties of an internal 
structure of a cognitive system and its parts (and relationships between 
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them) - unlike macrostructural properties which include relationships 
with the environment and other agents.2 
The claim about the determination of narrow content expressed 
in terms of local supervenience states that contentful properties depend 
only asymmetrically on microstructural properties of a cognitive 
system. Segal characterizes narrow content in terms of local 
supervenience on the microstructure of a cognitive system. He argues 
that microstructural properties are sufficient to determine the neural 
and computational properties of a system, i.e., narrow content: 
Fix an object's microstructure and you fix its atomic and 
molecular structure, its neurological and computational 
properties, and so on.  (Segal 2000, 14).  
The definition of narrow content in terms of local supervenience 
allows us to explicate more precisely how content is determined 
according to internalism, and at the same time, to indicate a problem 
related to the determination understood this way. Local supervenience 
does not allow us to precisely define the character of narrow content, 
since it does not provide a way to define properties independent from 
the external environment to the system, and narrow content depends 
only on these properties. On the contrary, it excludes only certain 
groups of (externalistic) accounts. Moreover, the consequence of a local 
supervenience claim is that all cognitive interactions with environment 
are irrelevant for content, which is fully reducible to the microstructure 
of the system. 
Here, an ontological reduction is at stake, that is, a relation 
between elements of the real world, such as objects, events or 
properties. It occurs if relationships, such as elimination, identity, 
superposition, realization, or supervenience occur (van Gulick 2001) ⁠. 
Because in internalism supervenience between properties is assumed, 
it is an example of such an ontological reduction. 
 
                                                 
2 The terms microstructural and macrostructural have been proposed by R. Poczobut, 
who formulated the supervenience claim in terms of micro and macrostructure 
(Poczobut 2007). 
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2.3. Fodorian methodological solipsism  
I will now concentrate on Fodor's defense of the concept of narrow 
content in his methodological solipsism (Fodor 1980; Stich 1980). 
Narrow content in Fodor's view arises from the reduction of semantic 
properties to syntactic ones and to innate semantic properties as well. 
This reduction, is not, however, a full naturalization, as it is unclear how 
innate content is determined. Thus, only a total reduction of the content 
to syntactic properties is fully consistent and naturalistic, but such an 
account on narrow content deprives it, alas, of its content. Consequently, 
the syntactic understanding of content is - contrary to what Fodor 
claims - inadequate for psychology and cognitive sciences. Thus, 
conceptual role semantics that would accept only narrowly understood 
content would not be a semantics for psychology. 
2.3.1. Narrow content in methodological solipsism  
Fodorian methodological solipsism plays a key role in developing the 
concept of narrow content in psychology and philosophy of psychology. 
Within this framework, Fodor attempts to defend methodologically 
individualist psychology as the only proper approach to psychological 
research. He responds to Putnam's counterarguments against the 
classical claim that intension determines extension 3 
Narrow content in methodological solipsism is characterized by 
inferential roles that are syntactic and computational.4 Fodor argues 
that knowledge of intrinsic properties, especially formal 
representational properties suffices to describe the content of a 
                                                 
3 Later Fodor did not link individualism in psychology and methodological solipsism 
so closely. Moreover, he distinguished between methodological solipsism and 
methodological individualism (Fodor 1987). According to methodological solipsism, 
mental states are individuated without semantic valuation; an (externally) relational 
taxonomy of mental states is methodologically unacceptable. Methodological 
individualism, on the contrary, allows for relational individuation of mental states 
provided that a mental state property is only included in the mental states taxonomy if 
it is causally relevant (Heath 2015).  
4 Identification of inferential roles with causal ones stems from the classic 
computational account of functionalism. Inferential roles characterized syntactically 
are roles in a computational architecture of mind (Field 1978; Fodor 1975). 
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representation. He claims that it suffices to express all content relevant 
to cognitive psychology. 
According to Fodor, a representational relation has two related 
members. It consists of a relation to a sentential object, described 
formally (syntactically), and of a relation to this object, described 
semantically in terms of truth and reference. However, as Fodor 
adduces, formal properties of narrow content are sufficient to 
distinguish semantically different representations. Fodor is, therefore, a 
proponent of a formalist account of a theory of content, whereby formal 
properties of signs (e.g., their shapes or structure) and syntactic rules 
are sufficient to characterize content.  
Fodor describes the mind as a so-called oracle machine, where  
“oracle” is understood, after Turing, as a procedure that settles a 
question in a non-computational (non-algorithmic) manner. According 
to Fodor, the role of oracle is played by the perceptual states of an 
environment: 
The point is that, so long as we are thinking of mental processes as 
purely computational, the bearing of environmental information 
upon such processes is exhausted by the formal character of 
whatever the oracles write on the tape. In particular, it doesn't 
matter to such processes whether what the oracles write is true; 
whether, for example, they really are transducers faithfully 
mirroring the state of the environment, or maybe the output end 
of a typewriter manipulated by a Cartesian demon bent on 
deceiving a machine (Fodor 1980, 65). 
Fodor claims that a formal difference makes a functional difference, 
which in turn makes a causal difference: 
The form of explanation goes: it's because different content 
implies formally different internal representations (via the 
formality condition) and formally distinct mental representations 
can be functionally different; can differ in their causal role. 
Whereas, to put it mildly, it is hard to see how internal 
representations could differ in causal role unless they differ in 
form (Fodor 1980, 68). 
For Fodor, this is a pragmatic argument for substituting formal 
properties with semantic ones in explanations. 
Fodor, like Davidson, defends folk psychology, and therefore 
points out that statements about beliefs, thus referentially opaque 
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contexts, are crucial in folk psychology. He even claims that folk 
psychology does not need anything more than an explanation of 
representation in opaque contexts, in which generalizations are about 
what people mean by propositions to which they express propositional 
attitudes. 
Propositions that occur in opaque contexts differ not only in 
content but also in their form. That is why such sentences do not 
undermine the Fodor’s assumption that only intrinsic structural 
properties have causal powers. Formal properties suffice, according to 
Fodor, to adequately describe the content, such as beliefs, even in 
opaque contexts. Later in this paper, I will argue against Fodorian 
concept of narrow content, according to which a formal difference is 
sufficient to explain the difference in intension. 
2.3.3 Concept innateness 
Fodor defends his own account of concepts, which is a philosophical 
interpretation of a classical theory of concepts, enriched by an 
innateness hypothesis. In a classical theory, the concept is: 
a class representation, covering all relevant properties of such 
class. A criterion of relevance is repetition - an essential feature is 
the feature that characterizes all objects belonging to this class, i.e., 
- in other words - the common feature of all objects belonging to 
this class (Maruszewski 1983). 
Maruszewski's definition differs just a little from the classical definition 
of connotation, according to which connotation of z is a property which 
applies to all z-s and only z-s (see also Jadacki 2001, 107). 
The innateness hypothesis states that our basic conceptual 
apparatus is innate.5 We have a language of thought, that is, an internal 
                                                 
5 The concept of innateness is unclear and can be understood in many different ways, 
especially since in contemporary psychology one does not disregard the biological 
basis of cognition. In biology, it is by no means clear not only what is innate but also 
what innateness is; philosophers of biology challenge the utility of such a concept 
(Samuels 2002, 2004; Griffiths 2002). One of the explications of the concept of 
innateness on the biological ground defines innateness as a disposition to behave 
under normal conditions. This explication, however, must go beyond narrow content, 
as normal conditions always appear in an environment. 
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code, to which all other concepts can be reduced, and we can perform 
proper combinatorial operations (Fodor 1975). For example, a non-
basic concept of BORING BOOK consists of basic concepts BOOK and 
BORING. One of Fodor's most important arguments for the language of 
thought hypothesis in psychology is the productivity of thought. 
Language is one such productive system. Fodor has to justify why it is 
language and not another productive representation system that is 
innate. The key argument for language innateness serves this purpose. 
Fodor (1975), analyzing psychological theories of concept 
learning, notes that they all regard learning concepts as a process of 
hypothesizing. Hypotheses can only be posed in language, and, 
therefore, in order for a child to pose them she must have an innate 
language of thought. Before she can learn concepts she must be able to 
formulate such hypotheses. That is why language, and not a different 
productive representation system, is innate: in a different system such 
hypotheses cannot be made. 
Let's go back to productivity. It is obvious that we can also think 
an infinite number of different thoughts; similarly, we can utter an 
infinite number of sentences, for example "Giraffes do not play poker". 
According to Fodor, it is impossible to explain the productivity of 
language and thought without assuming the compositionality of 
language. It is language that is so rich in structure that makes it 
productive. Therefore, as he claims, thinking occurs in a linguistic 
medium. 
A special case of concepts in the Fodorian account are concepts 
that can no longer be broken into constituent parts. These include 
concepts for simple sensory qualities, i.e., shapes and colors, and the 
simplest colloquial concepts. The structure of a concept also plays a role  
in deciding whether a concept belongs to a basic category: it must be a 
concept without which other concepts cannot be created in virtue of a 
compositional principle. For example, a concept BORING BOOK is a non-
basic complex concept consisting of a basic concept BOOK and a basic 
concept BORING - concepts BOOK and BORING cannot be simplified 
further and these are concepts without which creating a concept 
BORING BOOK would be difficult. 
By design, methodological solipsism forbids citing 
environmental properties in explaining the determination of the 
content of such basic concepts. Thus, they remain unexplained, and the 
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Fodorian account can never really explain how their content was 
determined. The content of basic concepts remains an aporia of 
methodological solipsism. Within methodological solipsism, 
determining the content of basic concepts is logically impossible: if they 
are innate, they depend not only on the individual cognitive agent but 
also on biological inheritance, which goes beyond the agent. 
The hypothesis of an innate conceptual apparatus could remain 
consistent with the local supervenience of such narrow content on the 
formal properties of a conceptual apparatus, if only the formal 
properties of this apparatus constituted the basis of conceptual content. 
Fodor, however, is opposed to the total reduction of semantics to formal 
properties. One way to solve the problem of the determination of 
content of basic concepts, which would allow him to preserve 
methodological solipsism, is to treat it precisely as a formalistic account, 
that is, purely syntactic. As a result, this could strengthen and radicalize 
Fodor's account. 
Fodor does not accept the strong claim that all semantic 
properties can be reduced to syntactic ones, but he claims something 
weaker: formal properties are the most satisfactory indicator of content. 
I do not intend to argue with that: indeed, the form is the simplest 
indicator of difference in content and, in addition to this, it works well 
in many situations. 
2.3.4. Methodological solipsism and a formalist account 
In this section, I will examine Stich's more radical account which argues 
for a complete reduction of semantics to syntax and, consequently, for 
the elimination of the notion of representation from folk psychology. 
Stich indicates to what exactly the reduction of content to formal 
property leads. In essence, Stich shows that an internalist concept of 
content is not a concept of content. This means that internalism cannot 
naturalize intentionality. 
Stephen Stich starts from a formalist interpretation of 
methodological solipsism, criticizing Fodor's argument for this position. 
Stich's counterargument can be understood as being directed against 
methodological solipsism as well as against psychology that uses the 
notion of representation. Stich's objection to Fodor's notion of narrow 
content shows that this notion is divergent from its folk counterpart 
and, consequently, cannot be used to defend folk psychology. Stich thus 
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argues for rejecting any concept of content. In addition, he is against 
representationalism because he thinks - as Fodor does - that 
computational psychology does not adhere to the principle of charity 
and thus, does not take the semantic properties of representations, such 
as truth, into account. 
Stich argues against Fodor that his concept of narrow content 
leads to undesirable consequences: 
First, most computational (or formal) mental states will have 
tokens (either actual or possible) whose contents are radically 
different from one another, as judged by our "aboriginal, 
uncorrupted, pretheoretic intuition". Second, there will be some 
computational mental state types whose tokens can be assigned 
no content at all by our aboriginal intuitions, though these 
"contentless" computational states will serve the purposes of the 
computational theory of mind fully as well as their contentful 
cousins (Stich 1980, 97). 
First, Stich observes the concept of narrow content leads to 
ascribing the same content in intuitively different cases. Second, he 
stresses that an account of narrow content typical for methodological 
solipsism leads to one more undesirable consequence: it does not forbid 
attributting content to beliefs radically diverging from our own beliefs, 
even if they violate common intuitions about their content. 
The cases of the first kind are analogous to Putnam's example of 
Twin Earth. I will mention one of them. In Stich example, Fodor from 
Yon (Putnam's Twin Earth analogue) appears and utters, analogically to 
Fodor from Earth: "Jimmy Carter is from Georgia." On the Twin Earth 
far apart from our Earth, even further than Yon, there could be a Twin 
Fodor, uttering the same sentence "Jimmy Carter is from Georgia". But 
then, according to the Fodorian account of narrow content, the same 
content should be attributed to this sentence on Twin Earth. Stich 
notices that this is completely inconsistent with a common intuition 
that different Fodors, depending on where they are located, speak of a 
different Jimmy Carter, depending on where they come from (assuming 
that on Yon and on Twin Earth there is also Georgia). I agree with Stich 
that the context of utterance should be taken into account while 
assigning content to a belief. Indeed, defending an account of reference 
of proper names requires one to accept a causal account of content that 
is incompatible with methodological solipsism. Dependence of content 
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on context is one of the reasons for adopting the wide account of 
content. 
The notion of narrow content should also be attributed to such 
things or creatures to which the principle of charity would forbid 
attributing any content. Stich illustrates this with examples of robots 
whose beliefs are so distant from ours that one can never agree that, 
according to the principle of charity, their representational states have 
any content. If there was a robot simulating a human being with beliefs  
vastly contradicting one other, the principle of charity would not allow 
us to attribute content to it, because, in such a case, neither truth nor 
accuracy of its "beliefs" could be treated seriously. Fodor has no way to 
deny that these "beliefs" are meaningful by his own lights. 
In conclusion, Stich shows that a formalist account does not lead 
to a defense of folk psychology but rather to its rejection. Although he 
agrees with Fodor that a formalist account suffices to describe content, 
he goes a step further, claiming that a notion of representation should 
be rejected totally from folk psychology. At the same time, according to 
him, we must reject a notion of narrow content and substitute it with a 
notion of form. I agree with Stich's argument against a notion of narrow 
content if narrow content is reduced to formal properties. Such a 
reduction does not properly describe content in contexts in which 
expressions differ in content but not in form. I propose, however, to 
treat Stich’s argument - contrary to his intentions - as a warning against 
an excessively hasty reduction of content to form and against the 
elimination of the concept of mental representation. 
Narrow content in methodological solipsism will not allow us to 
distinguish between representations whose form does not decide their 
meaning. This group includes homonyms (such as "bank") and 
representations whose meaning depends on the environment 
(Putnam's example of water on Twin Earth). Their form is the same, but 
the content is different because: (A) both intension and extension are 
different (in the case of homonyms); or (b) extension (of 
representations whose content depends on the environment) is 
different. A formalist account could deal with homonyms at the level of 
expressions, denying de facto their existence: by separating those 
sentences where the word "bank" in the meaning of "a bench of the 
river" is different from sentences in which there is a "bank" in the 
meaning of "a building in which you put your money" because of 
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inferential roles that these words play in sentences, and the roles 
determine the meaning of the word "bank". For formalists more difficult 
are homonyms at the level of the sentence, where a pragmatic context 
plays a decisive role: the sentence "You have huge feet!" uttered in a 
shoe store expresses the fact that someone has feet of large size, but 
uttered in the presence of someone with small feet is ironic. One should 
also remember the role played by the intonation: the same sentence 
said in a dismissive tone can be offensive (Dennett 1991). In the case of 
homonyms at the level of the whole sentence, resorting to inferential 
roles is practically infeasible - it is impossible to distinguish sentences 
that are so strongly contextually dependent, purely on a syntactic level, 
thus invoking only their formal properties.  
The formalist account may, however, show the difference in 
meaning between the sentences "George W. Bush voted for Barack 
Obama in 2012" and "The last but one ex-president of the US voted for 
Barack Obama in 2012," because the term "George W. Bush" has a 
different form than the term “the last but one ex-president of the US". 
The formalist account is valid in many interesting cases, in which 
the form of a vehicle corresponds to representational content. It would 
be a mistake to ignore formal properties in an account of content. 
However, in order for a formal account to fully replace semantics, it 
should be able to explain the cumbersome cases described above. 
Thus, the adequate account of content should not be a purely 
formal conception of content, since such an account is powerless in 
those contexts, in which the reference clearly decides about content. 
Twin Oscar's statement about water is therefore considered to be 
different from Earthly Oscar's statement in which "water" refers to a 
different chemical structure on Earth than the one to which it would 
refer on Twin Earth. It is therefore reasonable to assume that an 
adequate account of content should not be merely formal. 
 
2.4. Arguments against the formalist account 
2.4.1. Chinese Room thought experiment 
The most well-known polemic against supporters of a formal account of 
representation, in this case symbolic representation, can be found in J. 
Searle's Chinese Room thought experiment (Searle 1980). Searle who 
doesn't know any Chinese is enclosed in a room with a text file in 
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Chinese ("script") with some additional files: a set of rules (equivalent 
to a program) correlating the second file with the first one (called by 
Searle "a story") and a set of instructions given in English (questions), 
allowing to correlate elements from the third file with the first two. 
These instructions specify how to send certain Chinese symbols of 
certain shapes, responding to those shapes in a third file. Both the 
program and answers to such questions are for Searle purely syntactic 
transformations of symbols. Searle, in his room, is supposed to answer 
the questions given sometimes in English, and sometimes in Chinese. As 
it turns out, his answers to the questions in Chinese do not differ from 
those of a Chinese man who natively speaks Chinese. Additionally, the 
answers to questions posed in Chinese are as good when seen from the 
outside as the answers to questions in English. In the first case, Searle's 
answers are only non-interpreted symbols. 
Searle's thought experiment is supposed to deal with many 
philosophical issues, including consciousness, artificial intelligence, and 
mental representation. I will focus on the last issue, and within it, on the 
subject of my interest: the possibility to characterize content solely 
formally. For this purpose, I will appeal to one of many formulations of 
Searle's argument, and within it, to the interdependence of form and 
content (Hauser 1997). The argument has the following form: 
1. Programs are purely formal. 
2. Minds (or at least human minds) have semantics, mental 
content. 
3. The syntax itself does not constitute content nor is a sufficient 
condition for content. 
 
Programs themselves are neither constitutive nor sufficient for the 
functioning of mind. (Preston and Bishop 2002). 
Many philosophers question the validity of Searle's argument 
(Dennett 1987; Chalmers 1996). I think, however, that the core of 
Searle's argument, that is the claim that syntax is neither identical to 
content, nor sufficient to describe semantic content, points out a 
problem that has not been solved by a formalist account of mental 
representation. It is the case independently of Searle's own account of 
intentionality (Searle 1983) that is based on his intuition about the role 
of consciousness. 
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2.4.2. The systems reply 
The systems reply to Searle’s experiment comes down to a claim that 
although Searle, as a person confined in the Chinese room, does not 
understand Chinese, the whole system does (Searle 1980). Supporters 
of the systems reply point out that the fact that a person in a room does 
not understand Chinese does not imply that the system does not. And 
Searle has never shown anywhere that a whole system does not 
understand it. According to his opponents, Searle makes a mistake of 
identifying the part of a system with the system as a whole. Searle 
would be right only if understanding could be divided like mass. We 
may cut an apple into pieces: the mass applies both to an apple and to 
its component parts. Searle must in fact assume that every part of a 
systems thinks. So, if a person himself understands, a stomach or a liver, 
for example, understands too; if a stomach would not understand, then 
a person would not understand too (Copeland 1993). 
In response to this objection, Searle argues that, based on his 
opponents' arguments, a system that has memorized incomprehensible 
rules constitutes, together with a sheet of paper, a thinking system, 
which would be absurd. Searle states that there must be a difference 
between "genuinely mental" systems and those that are not genuine, 
and that the system itself must be able to detect the difference. Such a 
system displays - according to him - biologically "hardwired" 
intentionality. 
The problem posed by Searle is deep but his solution 
unsatisfactory. This is because Searle a priori settles the intriguing 
problem of demarcation between thinking systems and other systems, 
without showing what the differences actually are. The claim that 
systems are different definitely does not suffice as a solution. And why 
exactly are consciousness and biological brains important according to 
him remains unexplained. 
2.4.3. Chinese Room thought experiment reloaded 
In this section, I will briefly present Searle's experiment in a version 
slightly modified by S. Harnad; here I also separate the problem of 
intentionality from the problem of consciousness. Harnad helps us 
better describe the problem of the relation between a formal symbol 
and reference of mental representations, which, thanks to his paper, in 
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artificial intelligence has been called "the symbol grounding problem" 
(Harnad 1990). 
Harnad's experiment has two versions. In the first version, he 
describes learning Chinese as the first language using only a Chinese-
Chinese dictionary, while in the second one, he describes learning 
Chinese as a second language. The latter one he considers to be feasible, 
though difficult. However, theoretically crucial is the first one. 
In Harnad’s variant, the Chinese Room experiment is about 
grounding symbols in something other than other meaningless symbols. 
It is not other symbols, according to Harnad, that constitute meaning, 
but relations of the cognitive system with the world. The problem is not 
whether it is possible to translate some specific language of a given 
linguistic form into another language of another linguistic form, but 
rather how to relate a linguistic form to the world. 
Searle's argument, which is more evident in Harnad's version of 
it, is that syntactic properties are not sufficient to capture semantics, 
because for a proper description of semantics one also needs reference 
and logical value. The argument is thus directed against the internalism 
of a formalist vein. The formalist account does not allow us to account 
for the reference. As Fodor shows in the case of sentences with 
intensional contexts, formal properties of a vehicle make it possible to 
infer much about truth or falsity of representation. A formalist account 
does not, however, provide any explanation as to why a representation 
can be a vehicle of truth. Even if you accept a formalist assumption that 
mental representations have syntax, which is causally efficacious, it is 
not clear at all that representations have a property of being true of 
false. Moreover, under formalistic assumptions, it is by no means clear 
what physical structure could be considered syntactic and why certain 
syntactic constructs would correspond to falsehoods and others to 
truths. 
2.5. Internalism and intension determination via learning 
Internalists have difficulties in explaining action, which is related to 
their psychologically implausible approach to learning concepts. Fodor 
assumed that there were necessary and sufficient conditions for having 
concepts and that an account of narrow content should serve as a 
satisfactory psychological theory of learning (Fodor 1980). Such an 
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approach to learning does not allow, however, to take into account 
determination of intension via learning. 
Burge’s argument (Burge 1979) is aimed against the account of 
narrow content and is based on the human capacity to learn concepts. 
In his example, we are dealing with a thought experiment built 
analogously to Putnam's experiment, but Burge argues for a role of 
social context in content determination rather than for the 
determination by some physical facts. In the experiment, we compare a 
person whose physical states from birth until now are the same, but 
which occur in two situations that differ only in the linguistic 
community or in the social environment. As a consequence, such a 
person in these two situations uses a term arthritis differently: in the 
first situation the person knows well the extension of the term, and in 
the other, he or she uses the term arthritis to designate a disease that 
can occur in both muscles and joints. According to Burge, the extension 
of the term depends on the social context in which the person is raised 
and in which such a term is used. A defender of narrow content could 
answer that in the second situation the person has only an inkling about 
arthritis. He or she knows only that it is a disease but he or she is 
mistaken about what kind of disease it is. However, the defenders of 
narrow content go too far. They claim that assigning to a person any 
knowledge of the term’s extension is unjustified in the second case, 
since it is not known what it describes. 
Usually, learning concepts is time-consuming and gradual. 
However, according to the classical account, you have the same concept 
only if you mastered it completely; so the concept of arthritis that is not 
fully mastered is not yet a concept of arthritis. If that is the case, then 
we would have to assume that when we do not know necessary and 
sufficient conditions of concept application (and Fodor himself argues 
for the claim that, in general, we do not know them; cf (Fodor et al. 
1980)), we do not know the same concepts. Without the assumption of 
innateness, this leads to a very peculiar consequence. It is not easy to 
indicate necessary and sufficient conditions for the use of terms such as 
"game", "chair", or "animal", and if they were not innate, then according 
to the classical theory of concepts, we should say that we do not know 
them at all. However, if they are innate, then their content is not 
determined individually. Here again we come across the fundamental 
aporia of the Fodorian account: his nativism excludes methodological 
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solipsism, since innate concepts must have content determined by 
factors that do not supervene locally, i.e., have content that goes beyond 
narrow content. 
What an internalist, such as Fodor, argues against Burge, exposes 
the weaknesses of Fodor's internalism. Of course, an internalist could 
give up also the classic theory of concepts and nativism, but then 
Burge's argument would strike him. So he would have to agree that 
some determinants of content are social. 
2.6. Summary 
In this paper, I demonstrated that the argument of one-factor internalist 
account for the sufficiency of narrow content in the theory of 
representation is inadequate. To summarize, the characterization of 
narrow content leads either to ambiguity or to depriving the resulting 
concept of content of semantic properties. If by "narrow content" we 
mean – like Segal – the property of representational content that is 
completely independent of external factors to a cognitive system, the 
concept of content remains elusive and nobody knows what it could be. 
Although understanding content as partially independent from 
contextual factors allows us to hold content properties invariant in 
various situations, it seems that understanding content in total 
abstraction from the external factors of such properties does fit the bill. 
On the other hand, Fodor's formalistic account, in particular in Stich's 
radical interpretation, eliminates the properties of content to replace 
them with syntactic ones. 
Reasons quoted by defenders of narrow content, such as the 
ability to articulate thoughts independently of the context or thinking 
about non-existent objects, speak in favor of the concept of narrow 
content. Nevertheless, the concept of narrow content abstracts away 
from both reference and satisfaction conditions, without which it is 
impossible to understand how mental representations can be vehicles 
of content. The lack of connection to reference and satisfaction 
conditions makes it for the account of narrow content impossible to 
state anything about the adequacy of representation with regard to 
their targets or referents. Some of these representations apply to an 
environment, which, in the correct account of content, would explain 
adaptive behaviors of animals as based on adequate representations of 
an environment, such as orientation in an environment (e.g., through 
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cognitive mapping). Narrow accounts of content do not allow us to state 
that, for example, a predator made a mistake in hunting while looking 
for a victim. For this reason, semantic internalism is a mistake as a 
solution to the problem of intentionality. 
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ABSTRACT 
SEMANTIC INTERNALISM IS A MISTAKE 
The concept of narrow content is still under discussion in the debate 
over mental representation. In the paper, one-factor dimensional 
accounts of representation are analyzed, particularly the case of Fodor's 
methodological solipsism. In methodological solipsism, semantic 
properties of content are arguably eliminated in favor of syntactic ones. 
If “narrow content” means content properties independent of external 
factors to a system (as in Segal's view), the concept of content becomes 
elusive. Moreover, important conceptual problems with one-factor 
dimensional account are pointed out as a result of analysis arguments 
presented by J. Searle, S. Harnad and T. Burge. Furthermore, these 
problems are illustrated with psychological and ethological examples. 
Although understanding content as partially independent from 
contextual factors allows theorists to preserve content properties, it 
seems that understanding content in total abstraction from external 
factors of these properties is implausible. As a result, internalism is 
rejected in favor of externalism. 
KEYWORDS: internalism; externalism; one-factor dimensional account 
of representation; mental representation; Fodor; methodological 
solipsism  
